

Walking forward – Back to future Shaping of European Images

Part I Past Episodes

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The creation of a coherent image of Europe is challenged by two conditions. At the one hand, Europe looks back to a rich history of building nations, states and imperia. A multitude of images reflect it among elites and people. Nations have been generated as imagined communities (Anderson 1991). The fall and rise of empires through history have been favored objectives of social science. Scholars addressed it in studies (Anderson 1974/96; Braudel 1987; Hobsbawm 1994) and broadened the topic to a stream of research in face of globalization. The rise of empires was accompanied by political and societal models and by an imagery, which should legitimize hegemony. But nonetheless the symbolic frames, images and societal models remained at the margin of interest. Therefore the studies concentrated prim-

ordially on structural factors of politics and economy or on state and political ideologies (Münkler 2005; Bourdieu 1982). This paper addresses expectations, visions and ideas of Europe, rather “Idealfaktoren” of history (Max Weber). Elites and people tried to fill the vacuum by dreaming, imaging and modeling their „Europe“ under the point of a culture. In fact, the European landscape was and is a very diversified cosmos of regions, nations and culture.

At the other hand, the acceleration towards an integrated Europe needed very simple societal models, images and claims. Diversity, traditions and collective memories in the different parts, nations and regions had to be cut off. The creation of European-wide images occurred against the treasury of cultural resources and offers, which could shape the own society in regard to

If I should summarize the 20th century I would say that it evoked the greatest hopes in mankind's history but destroyed all illusions and ideals.”

Yéhudi Menuhin




Figure 1: Overview on episodes shaping the models and images of Europe since 2nd world war.

the neighbors. A kind of political advertising was imposed on these remembrances and models of thinking and feeling; groups and people rooted in these patterns became surprised by the new ideological imagery driven by the European integration process. Did they forget the ideals rooted in tradition? How could this imagery be summarized? Figure 1 gives an overview of significant periods.

I Pacification by market and reconstruction

This period is characterized by convincing motives for the unification of Europe after the 2nd World War. Breaking the rivalries of powers after war by economic cooperation provides a societal model basic for peace making strategies. Peace and negotiation are the central values for Europe since the horrible experiences of the 1st and 2nd World War. Evidently this civil scenario became the *master* model for Europe after the 2nd World War. It surely was one of those models supported by the masses and people concerned to the hard aftermaths of the war. In Western and Eastern countries impressing documents describe the period of this master model as a popular one. It could embrace

nearly the whole range of countries, social groups, peoples, elites as well as different cultures. It created a panorama bundling the feelings, insights, norms and hopes to a cluster enlightening every day life. Such a model emitted a corona: specific spheres of symbolic production, ideology, “Weltanschauung” or religions, sciences and arts sought their expression of a civil Europe as peaceful area. Evidently this mind was embedded into the episode of world society “acknowledgment of diversities” (Meier - Dallach 2009a/b).

A further observation is important. Master models exert pull forces. Driven by leadership, for instance personalities like De Gaulle, Churchill, Eisenhower, it attracts emotional, psychic and public supports from people and groups. But an ideal of civil society needs real factors, which guarantee its success. Hegel’s notion of master and servant is helpful. The master model needs a *servant* model, which has the power to drive people’s and elite’s energy to the ideals of master model. Civil society needs economy as well as “Idealfaktoren” demand “Realfaktoren” in order to avoid a schism between culture and politics as it is described as chronic phenomenon in Germany




Figure 2: Images prioritize a master model, here that of civil as peaceful Europe but demand servants for guaranteeing ideals through real factors, the efforts for one Europe by economy and exchange. So the vision for Kantian peace was furnished by positive meanings of a Europe basing on modern economy. Between master and servant models one observes interactions. Mutations explain changes; the servant becomes the master (see Hegel); the scenario of Smith (one world) is taking the role of Kant (civil society). See to the scenarios: http://www.culturprospectiv.ch/de:how_many_worlds

(Lepenies 2006/08). So the post-war Europe necessary called for a homogenous market area. The idea of one European economic market area should push energies to the master idea of Kantian peace (Russett 2007). Europe in civil terms by a united Europe in economic terms should push and pull the energies of Europeans toward the future.

II Two Europes and cold war

It would be very interesting to compare between the careers of master and servant models in Western and Eastern Europe. In Eastern European countries servant models were constructed under a socialist perspective; they had to push people to re-build destroyed cities, structures and infrastructures. Thereby, the “one-space” model in Eastern Europe followed the state oriented ideology of a planning model under the control of the geopolitical winning player of the 2nd war, the former Soviet Union; it was institutionalized as COMECON. In Western countries the servants were the liberal and free enterprises, the players of the markets under the promising outlooks to the United States and to the Marshall-plan.

However Europe’s career experienced a disruptive interference in real politics as well as in symbolic spheres. The peace master model was displaced by the power rivalries between Western and Eastern hegemonic interests during the cold war. They pushed the power model as master in two opposing forms, the NATO as its basis in Western and the Warsaw Pact as military organization in Eastern Europe. The mental geography between Western and Eastern Europe changed radically and favored models of domesticating by military power relying on war technologies, “high ideology” and moral discipline. For the first time after the 2nd world war the fear of an atomic catastrophe shaped the Hobbes scenario and principles. The Western European hemisphere as well as the Eastern area, its imagery, came under the stress of an imagined war. But it was finally a proof of Hobbes’s rule that the principle of “homo homini lupus” is able to avoid a fatal war between geopolitical players.




Figure 3: Europe experiences disruptive geopolitical rivalries on hegemony. The images of Europe were dominated by this master – deterrence and mobilization of means to guarantee it.

III New technological and consumer styles

Hegel's metaphor of "master and servant" is illustrative. The servants can become the masters as well as the masters can fall back to the status of servants. In fact, a further episode illustrates this transition. Bit by bit the civil model has lost its glance as master. Economy as servant of civil Europe began to pull the energy of elites, the idea of "One-Europe" in terms of a single economic market area became stronger. However this new master model never reached the same overall effect like the civil (peace) or domestication model. Furthermore, it was an issue of an elite promoting and pushing a new technological style (Bornschier 2002). It seems that the master model of this period was mainly an ideological effort of elites; so Ziltener (2003) concluded from evaluation reports that nearly all investigations of real economic effects caused by integration and single market programs show no or very low empirical effects in economic terms.

Indeed it seems that the European Economic Community was a construction of the same elite, later also negatively assessed as technocrats. A

basic divide goes back to the resistance and opposing motives and activities of cultural elites, which was never resolved.

But the technological dreams triggered a new imagery, the societal model of a worldwide push by technological innovations; again this episode was reinforced by the trends to one world in global terms. An era emerges where the images, values and achievements of technologies are the pushing forces of an economically worldwide successful Europe. It gained the appeal of important parts of society. One-Europe was driven by technological innovations shaping every day life and becoming a dream. But the servants of One-Europe were twins. Technologies, i.e. Radios and TV's, refrigerators, freezers, washing machines, vacuum cleaners, the cars and highways as big inventions captured more than the imagery of people. The technological paradise was more and more a consumers' paradise. The Frankfurt school of intellectuals was a critical minority group defiant to this servant-twins, who advanced more and more to masters. Horkheimer/Adorno (1969) characterized the modern period as an industrial shaping of cultures and




Figure 4: The former servant advanced to master: the one Europe vision based on technological push and consumption diffused. Man making modern was the most preferred civil value.

consequently of the symbolic production of images. The memory of the grand periods of European culture is the tacit master model; the critical accents are modulated by nostalgic elements.

IV *Agora and Roundtables*

The events during the late 80ties in Eastern Europe embarrassed social scientists holding deterministic concepts of societal change. The period is a testimonial of the hypothesis of Chase-Dunn (2005) that semi-peripheries can play the role of innovative forces for the building of a world system. People in Eastern European countries created interesting anti-systemic forces, especially at the early 90ties – and in Poland since 1980. The paradoxes surprised the world public; instead of occupations the control powers, police and military, did not leave their caserns; expected bloodsheds did not take place; instead of loudly riots people installed round tables, while the power hierarchies have been silently dissolved as Kapuscinsky (2006) describes it in a fascinating way. The matrix of bureaucratic controls and the routines to cope with them in every day life disappeared over night. The dark zones, protected by the former power, have been admitted to discus-

sions.

Hopes overwrote fears. But an alternative vision didn't exist yet, neither for the own society's pathways to the future nor for the global society. The consciousness and models of society floated. The post-socialist ambivalences became the relevant force in symbolic practices and debates. The shaping of the own images and of the models of the larger and the international society started from the chaotic zone; it was like a zero-point for finding new images and models for the future. The paradox is astonishing: While Fukuyama (1992) declared this zero-stage of mankind as the end of history, its completion by the liberal and capitalist market order, the Eastern European people experienced it as an endless circle of question marks. The phenomenon of "floating minds" can be observed in private as well as in public spheres (Meier-Dallach 2005).

In Eastern Europe a rich pool of country-specific and regional diversities was freed, arising from forgotten or forbidden zones to the surface. How could it be utilized for interactions, contacts and exchanges between the Eastern and the other parts of the world? Lepenies (2008) illustrates this last act,




Figure 5: Negotiating and Round tables in Middle Eastern and Eastern Countries created a new master for a short time. Recovering diversity enriched the civil quality of Europe.

where cultural elites have been predominant, in an essay but this rupture is evident to all who are engaged into cooperation with Eastern European partners.

V Governance by joint policy making

The further generation of images shaping the symbolic empire of Europe is basic. The imagery of Europe fell under the stress of fears. After the breakdown of the Soviet Union the world changed from a “two-world” to the “one-world” model. In the meantime new players entered the global arena. They constructed their images from ambitious hopes. The BRICs, Brazil, Russia, India, China and other newcomers articulated their own master models. These start from rising expectations to get its own position in the worldwide development.

In contrast to the models of the newcomers, motivated by visions, the European model constructed out of fear is forfeiting its attraction. Again Europe needs a new master model: “governance by joint policy”. However, domesticating Europe’s wide range of diverse countries and cultures is a radical challenge; it is hard to create an attrac-

tive model if its sources are fears to lose as a player in the new global era. The new emerging model, claiming for a pan-European governance, seems to have attained its critical point. Obviously, it has been confronted with serious deficits right from the start. It has never reached the role of a master model; even among elites and the masses of citizens it missed the pull effects. It is far from becoming a panorama-like image. Several empirical trends that the joint governance model is not compatible to European diversity were evident long before the rejection of the EU-constitution referendum in France (2005). It seems that mainly the time-regime of building joint governance failed. The time imposed by the Euro-Atlantic civil model on the “non-civil” societies or parts of Europe was too speedy in face of the time resources needed by civil models, which address cultural values and innovation inherent to own traditions. In fact the time management is a decisive factor of building empires (Münkler 2005); the struggle for the time is an interesting field for observing diffusion processes of societal models between the Atlantic and Ural (Meier-Dallach 2002).




Figure 6: A new era started by including and integrating the new players of Eastern Europe under the umbrella of one Europe and liberal democracy as civil value. Domesticating meant also to include the newcomers into the NATO.

VI Transformation through norms and coordination

“Transformations” aim currently to respond to the weakness of the former periods and its models. Europe starts to replace its mission by a new master model: looking back to the success story, again the civil Europe should dominate the symbolic cosmos. However, it needs the legacy and competences for governance, i.e. for converting and domesticating the newcomers from the East. Since most Eastern European countries have been seen as non-civil societies, an assessment recently also criticized by Western scholars who address the real situations of the former socialist states (Lane 2005), the EU feels itself in the role of a missionary. The former master model, joining the nations and regions under a European umbrella of policy, becomes the servant for a new set of civil values and aspects.

But in the meantime, the civil qualities of Europe have been defined and fixed as standards of the EU. How can people be attracted for civil values, which are in the first instance offered as standards, coordination measures and legal norms? The period of “transformitis” is a forced conversion over the

heads and hearts of people. And there is a further essential failure. The new parts of Central and Eastern Europe are looking back to a rich symbolic capital of images and models. The Central Eastern countries, the Balkan communities and the Slavic cultures of the former Soviet Union fought for societal models of a “good society” since old times. And they are acquainted with the Western contributions to these models since the Middle Ages, while the Western nations and leaders systematically are demonstrating their lack of interest to find out what could mean civil society in the “freed” new areas of Europe; the Eurobarometer seems to satisfy their curiosity. The period of “transformism” is not digested at all. An example of “transformism” gives a recent wiiw report (Römisch, Ward 2005). Models of development of peripheral regions in the new EU-countries are defined by the standards and indicators of Western European top regions; there is no reflection of a possible innovative treatment of peripheries, which have to conform to a pathway imposed by the tops. Such biased pictures could become one of the most significant cultural disasters of the current European history.




Figure 7: Civil society is again the master but changed to other values: standardization, the implementation of European wide norms and rules. These rational goals are motivated and justified by one Europe, free markets, and coordination also with an outlook on the world wide geopolitical constellation of power.

Once again Europe stays before an ambiguous situation. On the one hand, it feels the pressure to become a first ranked player in world affairs and consequently needs models defined by strong visions and not by fears. On the other hand, Europe is a treasury of manifold but also diverse symbolic resources, i.e. the societal models of the Western *and* Eastern nations. What is the best way to deal with this diversity? There are two groups interpreting the today's situation controversially, the Euro-Romantics against the Euro-Fatalists (see note, p 9).

VII Diversity and recovering identity

There are signs that a new “diversity” period for Europe is on hand. The models for an own Europe are coming back in varying forms. The forgotten symbolic resources become a source for the construction of new master models. Is there a scenario foreseeable, where the trends to a imagery anchored in cultural terms predominate?

It is evident that such a “diversity” period is probable. Looking to the global arena the modern *centaurs*, Janus-faced players, are evident. The

new players are ambiguous beings since they struggle with two faces. One is aimed to succeed in the world market area, the other to preserve the own culture, values and identity. In China, for instance, the latter seems to be the master model, while the modern face, the economic one-world era, constitutes the servant one. But the faces can be changed very pragmatically. The centaurs are bringing back the own worlds latent in the collective memories to the global and European area. It can be expected that this revitalisation or rediscovering of “dark zones” will influence the European nations and regions. The panorama of the symbolic space will be countered by the values and aspects obscured by the master models of the former periods. It is probable that the European models will rediscover and include such shadow zones much more than before; one of the reasons will be the bearing of the Eastern European countries; their imagery and symbolic structures are still under the shadow of the Western cultural hegemony.

Symbolic empires relying on ambitious master images can be endangered. In order to illuminate a very broad area, the models suffer from



Figure 8: The Europe of recovered diversities and autonomies regains influence and seems to become a master at different places and in various situations. This counter trends are obviously responding to former masters falling back to servants for them.

overstretching. They should be valid and attractive for a Russian, Sicilian, German, Italic and Polish citizen across a very diverse landscape of specific cultures and symbolic expressions. The big master models collapse in face of genius loci. There is another consequence – the *flattening* of images and models. The wider, faster and further-reaching models and images should be diffused, the more they have to be discharged from deepness, authenticity and originality. The overstretching as well as the flattening of European models evokes an increasing stress on European citizens. However, these weak sides of all-European imagery are strongly felt in the Slavic area, where various linguistic cultures exist and have stayed vital. These phenomena are countered by needs for more authentic values and forms based in roots of culture.

A master model like the civil one plays its charismatic and attracting role as long as it offers a *panorama* of symbols. It is powerful only as a whole. But this period is short because Europe is under the stress of time. The civil model is moving apace to the *matrix* zone. Here the image of civil society is transformed into a set of standards,

regulations and components. There is a fatal schism between the panorama- and the matrix-form. If the latter is experienced the primary charismatic model loses its symbolic power and attraction. This rule gets evident in the recent crises of trust between the EU and its member states and citizens. Maybe with exception of the peace model, this change damaged previous approaches. The sun shone too shortly, only as long as the models started to be transformed into matrix forms. The bureaucratic routines are the death of strong and attractive master models in societies.

Societal models and images reflect the fields of imagination. Imaginations do not follow the logics of the rational and analytic rules at the matrix pole. They bring together what a scientist or lawyer separate, forget things, which are natural, or see god in the hell and demons in the heaven. Therefore the symbolic cosmos has a *chaotic* zone where societal models are radically opened to various mixtures of meanings and symbols. In feudal societies the court jester represented this disturbing approach to symbolic power. The European ambition to be the inheritor of the culture of rationalism and enlightenment as the fundament of a

Euro-Romantics

Looking back to history they support the return of cultural diversity. According to them all empires, from the Celtic, Carolingian, Holy Roman, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, Napoleonic, British, Austrian, Nazi German, Bolshevik ambitions, found its end in face of cultural borders and diversities. The image of Europe defined in terms of regional or national units gained always the victory over models of a homogeneous Europe. This victory is independent from the type of a centre or alliance, which has launched and driven such a "progressive" line. The traces of remembrance are regularly stronger than the paths for a progressive line to a stable unified area. In face of the worldwide clashes of cultures, diversity will come back to Europe. And maybe it is back since May 2005, the national rejections of the European constitution project.

Euro-Fatalists

The opposite groups refer to the global level, when they label the actual situation of Europe as the radical turning point. After the 90ties Europe a driving as well as a driven force due to global trends gained the power. The period of transformism remains the necessary strategy. For surviving in the global trends to a one-world a backlash to the European diversities is counter-productive, if not even suicidal. The rivalries on the global markets, accelerated by the newcomers (BRICs) impede Europe to fall back to the remembrance tracks. In their eyes, it is a question of survival to overcome the European diversities. They are the strongest obstacles for the European player in global games. The dreams of an own nation in a manifold Europe and of a world, where particular cultures remain vital, are over.

The Shaping of European Images: Part I Past Episodes

global society has strongly excluded chaotic trends. The European imagery suffered a protestant cleaning effect. It contrasts hardly to the trends for creolisation (Boli 2005) outside of the European area but also obvious inside of it.

The One-Europe vision is currently under symptoms of stress. The financial crisis touches those countries in Eastern Europe that the first time sailed on a wave upwards. The master model of one economy is damaged. We need part II addressing the “presence of past episodes”, i. e. the question of how current developments and events impact the power of past models and trigger new ones facing future.

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