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**Hans-Peter Meier**

**The Regions in the Image of the Population**

**New Beginning or Renaissance?**

**UKRAINE –**

# **UKRAINE - New Beginning or Renaissance? The Regions in the Image of the Population**

***Hans-Peter Meier***

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Synthesis of and results from the INTAS-project, "Regions in the Ukraine",  
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## Abstract

The survey conducted 1200 oral interviews in a cross-section through the regional system of the Ukraine. At the helm was a concept which considered the importance of the regions for the Ukrainian population in the process of change. The results have shown, that the population attaches three meanings to the region: First, it considers itself to be emotionally attached to the region and identifies it as a part of 'private fatherland' (Ossowski). Secondly, it is expected of the region and the local self-governments to be come modern and, at the same time, social within the regional framework in times of crisis. In this context, regionality is considered as a rationally oriented association and an instrument for organising the society. In the Ukraine, regionality stretches beyond these given meanings into a third: memory. The memory of the history of the nation works in two shifts. In the western and, though weakly, central Ukraine, there is a struggle for an independent Ukrainian nation. This is characterised by an emphasis on the renaissance of the Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian as the preferred national language, and ethno-cultural demarcation. The other regions, especially the eastern region and the "New Ukraine" (southern Ukraine and Crimea), have a tendency towards the other memory. They see the Ukraine as a part of a Russian history and statehood. They are more sceptical to the aspects of a cultural renaissance and put emphasis on Ukrainian/Russian bilinguality.

The ethno-culturally different identity converts itself into vast differences, when international orientations are explored. The Western Ukraine strongly refuses a unification with Russia, whereas this is, or could be, accepted by a majority in the Crimea, Eastern and, partially, in the Southern region. Debate exists between the two sides of the NATO membership issue, while other issues, especially accession to the EU, are not so controversial. In the foreground of the consciousness of Ukrainian society stands an alarming social crisis. However, possible solutions are evaluated as pessimistic and fatalistic. There is a loss of trust between political players and institutions on the one hand and the population on the other. Results confirm that the attitudes and the opinions in this case intensify in certain directions: disconsolidation, contradictions, nihilistic tendencies, which can be associated with indifference and conformism. This is related to an observation which might appear to be a paradox for a "new nation". A majority of the Ukrainian people prefers to orient themselves on the past rather than the present and the future.

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Internationalisation, globalisation and world-wide liberalisation of the markets are the currently dominating keywords. More importance is lent to the international coordinates of orientation and politics than ever before in pub-

## Regional Bonds and Identity

The project is a survey into the unknown. The region in the Ukraine is an historically shaped, yet simultaneously new reality. The unknown cannot be studied without knowing the known. There are countries in Western Europe, where the regions are historically and structurally strongly anchored in the political culture. In that sense, as a third perspective, we have summarised the results of the study of the Ukraine, inserting at certain points the picture of the region, which has developed in countries with a strong regional tradition within the population. The contrasts between the two "worlds" from the same point of view of the regions are quite large, as will be seen. But they provide the starting point for initiating a dialogue about what the region can mean for and what it can contribute to the transformation of a country into a new society.


In scientific literature and in the publicised view, the foundation of the so-called civil society, the population, is often missing, because, first and foremost, the ideas of the elite find their way into studies and press reports. This project has been conducted the other way around. For a cross-sectional study of the regions of the Ukraine, 1200 citizens (male and female) of the Ukraine were selected and interviewed by a questionnaire specially developed for the concept (see Appendix).

The project, through which the following important results have been compiled, was conducted in three different ways. The Ukraine is a country in the process of rapid change. Although this transition can be compared to that in other countries of Eastern Europe, it is here especially difficult and complex. Since the changes of 1989/90 in Eastern Europe, there has been a wide-spread discussion and literature, which concentrate on the transformation in view of the entire system. However, the method employed takes the path "from below". The Ukraine is not studied as a system, but rather as a nation in view of the regions. The tensions appearing in the emerging nation are illuminated by the "internal architecture".

## Introduction: A Survey into the Unknown

lic debates in Eastern as well as Western Europe. One forgets thereby, that this world-spanning orientation is only a viewpoint of the elite. The house where the population feels at home and comfortable is, and will remain, the domestic area. In the Ukraine the affiliation to either the nation or to the region as a space of social experience, orientation and emotional bonds are predominant (figure 1). Not even one-fifth of the population considers international membership to be of primary importance. The affiliation to the former Soviet Union is emotionally placed at top by only a few. The jump to the cosmopolitan identity of being a world citizen is marginal. These results are similar to the situation in the countries of Western Europe. In Switzerland, for example, studies have shown that the population prefers regional or national identification to international or global<sup>1</sup>.

Figure 1: Spatial identification patterns in the Ukraine: answers to the question "As what do you identify yourself primarily/secondarily?"



The conclusion is the same for Eastern as well as for Western Europe. The concentration of the political and economical elite upon the international coordinates of politics, economics and defence is in clear contrast to the significance of the domestic realm for the populations of Eastern and Western Europe. While the elite is debating in the EU, the population is living essentially and emotionally in its regional and national areas. This difference between the top and the bottom is a big dilemma in politics. It is reflected

The majority of regions in the Ukraine have an equalised orientation towards the inside, i.e regional and national bonds are equally strong. The western Ukraine, the south, the north as well as the central regions are representatives of this equalised pattern. It is a balanced regionally and nationally oriented pattern.

Regionalists	Eastern, South-Western, Crimea
Balanced	Western, Southern, South-Eastern, North-Eastern, Central, Northern
Nationalists	Kiev, North-Western
Nostalgic international orientation	Kiev, North Eastern, Crimea
Internationalism	Kiev, Northern, North Eastern, South-Eastern, Crimea

Figure 2: Spatial identification patterns according to a trend reinforcing the corresponding level of space (see figure 1)

**Diffuse Patterns of Varying Spatial Orientation**

In certain areas, regional identity is a way of undermining the nation. Spatial identity is primarily directed inwards. In the Ukraine, the eastern, the southwestern areas and the Crimea have a tendency towards this direction (figure 2). Crimea tends to have simultaneously a spatial identification directed towards the outside. The Ukrainian nation is, thereby, undermined by a strong attachment to ones own region and is simultaneously skipped over by more international orientations. Internationally oriented patterns are mostly found in areas that were first included later as part of the nation. Crimea, for example, joined the Ukraine later on<sup>2</sup>.

Kiev strengthens national identification and also international orientation. This pattern is typical for the political-historical centre, which is the core of the nation and, as the centre, also strengthens international orientations. It is a national-oriented pattern of spatial identity. Here, the identification with the nation is stronger than the regional bond. At the same time, it also implies that the region is considered the frame of reference for the entire nation.

in the low trust the people have in the elite, which concerns itself more with macropolitics than with micropolitics.



In older nations, like the new Nation of the Ukraine, where dramatic crisis situations have to be handled, the population behaves concentrically. The domestic realm is the primary area of emotional bonds. The international area is secondary. The local and regional area is central in developing politics focusing on life sentiments, existential needs, and perspectives of the population.

## **A Comparative Study of Regionalism – An Overview of the Procedures and Results**

The theory maintains a distance to the multitude of empirical data. Viewed from an optimal distance, the individual results can be clustered together under similar points of view, that is as identity orientations. They allow concepts to be recognised that give shape and form to individual facts. Which clues should lead the way out of the labyrinth of numerous possible relationships?


The starting point is the data and the material from the Ukraine, whose study alone would suffice to produce a monograph<sup>3</sup>. We have selected the other way: dialogue. The data from the Ukraine is interpreted with a simultaneous view of countries, which have a longer tradition of regional sociology<sup>4</sup>. The result is more interesting than when only one case is considered.

However, the following conclusions have not been drawn from a strict theory. Rather, a path was chosen, which elaborates regionalism in the context of other phenomena of the Ukrainian society. Figure 3 shows an overview of this path. The theme is conceptually oriented on images which reflect or articulate parts of reality. The meanings of "regionality" in the collective consciousness develop within the framework of a spatial view. Within the spatial consciousness, these meanings are reflected in other images which represent the cognitive context. The social, temporal, state, political and historical images are the windows for a complete understanding and revelation of regional consciousness.

The path to an understanding of the region cannot start in the Ukraine with the region itself. One has to begin with certain images in the prescribed sequence, in the Ukraine with the image of society. Its message is the alarming social crisis. The first ramification is quite surprising when compared to western countries. The Ukrainian population has a temporal perspective of life (temporal image) that is directed backwards. This is not

natural for a new nation, where, usually, mainly positive developmental aims and expectations prevail<sup>5</sup>.

Figure 3: Overview of the Paths to Regionalism in the Ukraine



One can understand regionalism in the Ukraine only when one views the crisis in terms of the state and political view of the population. This is characterised by a loss of trust between the people and the political actors in their ability to take control of problems and solve them. Does one trust oneself, in the flow of events, to mobilise and activate ones own powers? In their self-image, the Ukrainian population shows an alarmingly deep trust in their own ability to influence the course of events.

In the spatial view of the Ukrainian population, the region is a place of emotional bonds. But the idea of the region as an efficiently behaving participant remains unclear. It is later termed as embryonal regionalism, which is different from crystallised regionalism, which can be seen, for example, in Switzerland.


The collective memory is important for understanding the region in the Ukraine. Two memories, one Russia-friendly and one independence-oriented, clash with each other. They create tensions in the new nation whenever the question of a renaissance of the national culture is raised. International orientations are debated along the separating lines of these memories. Here, the observations from Western Europe conform to those in the

Ukraine. Even in Switzerland, for example, memory supports the path, that the young, internationally inclined, French-speaking Switzerland leads to their EU-oriented identification, whereas the central and domestic oriented, German-Swiss culture emphasises its own independence.

## Intensification of the Social Crisis

The Ukrainian population forms its life perspectives within the focus of the social image. This is experienced and indicated as a threatening poorhouse. The social equilibrium is considered to be by and large threatened in regional society.

Figure 4: Developments in the regional society (oblasty) feared for the next ten years (answers to the question "will rather increase")



The list is topped by fears that the basic quality of health would go down, along with the worsening standard of living, and the increase of social gaps in the region. The second place is occupied by the fear, that the ecology would get worse. Only in third place comes the fear that the modernisation

of the economy and technology would not be put into practice to a sufficient extent. That is, those values considered by the modern-minded elite as having top priority are placed at number three by the Ukrainian population: the necessity of an economical-technical advancement. Finally, in last place, is the fear of losing cultural independence or identity.

The social crisis-consciousness in the Ukrainian population is dramatic. It is confirmed when the whole nation is viewed. Amongst the national problems, the top priority is given by and large to an improvement in the welfare of the citizens of the Ukraine (57%), i.e. the social values of daily life. The other areas, namely maintenance of peace (34%), personal security against crime (28%), and fighting crime (23%) are included in the group with average priorities. Clearly far behind are the system-oriented values which refer to the reform of the system, the struggle against inflation or the transition to market economy, as well as ecology or human rights.

Comparing these results with similar results from a Western European country, Switzerland, the disparities are drastically clear. Just about five years ago, in 1992, the population had the fear of missing the link to modernisation. The fear, that the crisis, felt only weakly at the time, threatened social values, was in the last place. Since then, the crisis has intensified noticeably even in the western countries. Increasing unemployment and job cutbacks has elevated the importance of a social viewpoint in the population. Still, ecology and the protection of the regional and the national autonomy have remained central in the thoughts and values of the population. In the Ukraine, the population's priority, as expressed in their fears, is univally concentrated on social issues. Society, in the daily thinking of the population, is, above all else, perceived, evaluated and constructed in relation to social crisis. In Switzerland, for example, the perception of society as being "in crisis" has different meanings depending upon different points of view.

One common feature, however, is noteworthy in this disparity. Modernisation is a controversial issue in both Switzerland and the Ukraine, when the population is asked. The push for modern technology and market-economy efficiency is given the same value in both countries by the economic, political and scientific elite: the absolute top priority of all social problems. The elite, thereby, sets a similar priority in both countries. Modernisation aims at a rapid change of system values. The elite of both countries emphasise the fact that modernisation of the system is also the key for solving the everyday social problems?

The population refuses to accept this elitist vision. This is true not only for countries undergoing a dramatic transition, but also for western societies developed to the highest technological level. The fear of becoming a loser in the system as a result of forced modernisation causes the less privileged social groups to push social problems to top priority. Tension arises between the option for a modern-oriented regionalism and the wish for a socially-oriented regionalism, which, to date, has not been solved in any country.

## **Nostalgia in the Perception of Time**

Social crisis shapes life orientation in relationship with time. Normally, an insecurity in the present produces a backward orientation toward the past, whenever the prospects for a satisfying solution appearing in the near future seem slim. A positive view of the future is missing in 85% of the Ukrainian population. The majority (41%) emphasises the past instead of the future, and only 28% regard the present as the most important orientation.


In the western region, the crisis reinforces a step back into history, a return to past-oriented regionalism. The present as the reference of orientation dominates in the eastern region. In contrast to the western Ukraine, the past is not so attractive here. Urban areas reinforce the memory of the industrial society, which is oriented towards the present. Here, the past probably means remembering the Soviet system. Juxtaposed between these two conflicting regions are the other three regions: the southern, the central and Crimea. The future-oriented perspective is emphasised mostly in Crimea. International orientation is linked here to an orientation towards the future. This observation has a noteworthy parallel. Younger regions, those which have joined the nation only recently, often link a strong future inclination with a strong international orientation<sup>8</sup>.

## **The Loss of Trust in Politics, State Affairs and Self Perception**

In daily life of the Ukrainian population, a social crisis implies having a too meagre and/or insecure income, which makes it difficult to maintain the necessary living conditions. This can be seen from the fact that three-fourths of all persons polled describe their financial situation as bad or very bad. Even in the group of those who consider their income to be average,

about 57% feel themselves to be in distress because of their low income. A large portion of the Ukrainian population is living in poverty, or is right on the verge of it. This situation is expressed as a dramatic loss of trust in the political agents and institutions. The open question, who could improve the situation, was answered by 50% with "nobody" (sum of the first and second response). Pessimism about the future in the perception of time repeats itself in the view of politics and the state as an absence of a strong figure who could act.

Figure 5: Significance of past, present and future as life-perspective in Ukraine and in the regions




It is remarkable that „local authorities and agents“ have been given the top ranking (52%). Local courses of action are viewed more positively than investing hope in the government, the population at large, the Supreme Rada, parties or other forces of society (each ranking below 20%). The favored perspective is locally and regionally inclined. In reality, 80% of those who set their hopes on the local and regional players are also of the

conviction that local self governments and the regions will have to play a bigger role in the future development of the Ukraine. One could call this perspective self-help regionalism.

It stands out from the regionalism of self-sufficiency, in which case the region is a means of holding on to gained privileges. It is the final destination of regionalism in countries with a strong tradition of regional autonomy. This form is well known, for example, in Switzerland. The contrast between the Ukraine, which, in the future needs a regionalism of self-help, and Switzerland, where the self-sufficiency protection of privilege is not rare, could not be bigger.

The loss of trust lies primarily between the population and political authorities or institutions, and exists on all three levels. If there are institutions in the Ukraine capable of building trust in themselves, they are the Church and the Army (Figure 6).

Figure 6: Trust in authorities and institutions; percentages of those assigning a high level of trust to the specified levels of authority and power



The Ukraine is a typical example of a changing society in which problems are accumulating. From the people's viewpoint, the political institutions responsible for the nation's affairs have four problems to address: (1) Providing for basic social and individual needs, (2) creating new democratic

and civic-social structures, (3) the transition to the modern market economy and (4) the formation and consolidation of a new nation. In the last few years since the Ukraine gained independence (1991), to which both the people and the regions made a positive contribution, the political governing bodies and the power structures have struggled to come to terms with all four problems.

One may conclude from the survey results that the failure in the primary area, namely providing for basic social and individual needs, has been the biggest cause of popular dissatisfaction. Success in democratic and economic reforms is less important to the general population<sup>9</sup>. The renunciation of national independence has emerged as a clear trend since 1991. Along with Crimea, the population in the southern and the eastern regions is advocating reunification with Russia. The political governing bodies find themselves in a tense situation. Even the consolidation of the Ukraine as a new nation, which undermined trust and political legitimacy in the beginning, could fail. The sources of trust and political legitimacy have drifted away to other bodies, which in the last instance appear as guarantors of action: tangibly the Ukrainian Army and intangibly the Orthodox Church.

Empirical studies show that, even amongst western welfare organisations, mistrust in the political governing bodies has increased since the end of the 1980s. The population's loss of trust in the state has been conditioned to a large extent by social disconcertedness, job losses, and cuts in social security. At the same time, the grounding of democracy, the establishment of the market society, and the building of the nation are viewed in the West as complete. One feels here as a "developed" nation and as a part of the modern world.

Despite this, the differences between "developed" and "new" nations cannot be hidden by their similar developments. Free-flowing technological modernisation and globalisation of the market economy puts a question mark over democratic self-government and with it, in part, political legitimacy even in western countries. In "developed" nations with strong regional traditions, this leads the population to reject international or global structures and to return to a culture of national and/or regional autonomy.

### **Fatalism in Self-Imagery**

One of the most important achievements of "civic culture"<sup>10</sup> is the participation of the citizens in public life. The prerequisite for this is the presence of trust in the population that one can actively influence the course of



events. In a society which scarcely trusts the ability of the government to act, it is all the more important that the people place trust in their own ability to act. The evidence, however, shows just the opposite. The fatalistic attitude, that one is influenced almost completely by external events, is a majority opinion (56%) in the Ukraine. Less than 20% regard themselves as capable of taking control of events (the remainder classify themselves variously). This fatalistic attitude is strongest amongst older, rural and less literate social groups in the Ukraine. This is clearly a very poor starting point for initiating regional movements oriented in self-help in those places where it is needed the most: in the rural areas and for the needy.

An argument can be taken up here which deals with the historical heritage of the Ukraine as a belated or impeded nation. It states that the Ukraine has remained an oppressed culture, a culture of submission, not because of its historically difficult constellation, but due to an assumption of inferiority<sup>11</sup>.

## **The Collective Memory**

Historians characterise the Ukraine as a belated nation. Under historically difficult conditions, the Ukrainian national consciousness developed in an interplay between separation from and alliance with different empires, mainly the Polish-Lithuanian Empire, Russia and Austria. Under the conditions of internal ethnic fragmentation, the changing affiliations of parts to different empires, the building of an independent nation with consolidated sovereignty was difficult. The history and experience of the Ukrainian nation was overshadowed for 80 years by the Soviet Empire. Does the collective memory of a delayed nation suppress earlier times?

Results reveal that they currently continue to live on in the minds of the people. The Ukrainian collective memory can be divided regionally. We recognise the regional profile that the nation endows to the current attempts of redesign and redevelopment.

The events and characters in the earlier history of the Ukraine until the October Revolution in 1917 are seen by the people in a more positive light than those in the recent, Soviet-influenced history. Only the declaration of independence (1991) reaches a still higher value.

Note-worthy is the regional geography of the collective memory. All the events directed towards a delimitation against Russia and for an Ukrainian nation find strong support in the western region and in the central Ukraine,

Figure 7: Positive Evaluation of Historical Events and Personalities from the History of the Ukraine (mean value of an additive index of answers supporting their importance)

Events	West	Central	South	East	Crimea	Ukraine
Perejaslawl Treaty (1654)	2.18	2.47	2.51	2.59	2.15	2.43
Zaporizka Sich	2.74	2.68	2.67	2.58	2.04	2.63
Hetman Ivan Mazepa	2.55	2.28	2.23	2.09	1.66	2.24
October Revolution (1917)	1.57	2.01	2.35	2.13	2.24	2.01
Symon Petlyura	2.14	1.80	1.50	1.52	1.20	1.71
Ukrainian Insurrection Army	2.28	1.89	1.44	1.62	1.46	1.81
Stephan Bandera	2.23	1.69	1.39	1.41	1.10	1.65
Vlodymyr Scerbuc'kyi	1.80	2.07	2.11	2.17	1.88	2.05
Collapse of USSR	2.40	1.64	1.35	1.29	1.05	1.62
Declaration of Independence	2.82	2.22	1.83	1.72	1.60	2.10

Legenda:

Perejaslawl Treaty (1654) Chmelnyckyj, the Hetman of the Cosack Army, who liberated Ukrainians from Poland, agrees with an alliance treaty with the Car of Russia.

Zaporizka Sich The military organisation of Cosacks was liquidated by Catharina II of Russia.

Hetman Ivan Mazepa 1686-1708) Mazepa became an alliant to the Swedish army against the Car of Russia.

October Revolution (1917) Russian Revolution and victory of the Red Army.

Symon Petlyura (1919/20) Fought together with Poland against the Red Army.

Ukrainian Insurrection Army Army fighting against Nazis and Red Army during 2nd World War.

Stephan Bandera (2nd World War) Leader of a faction fighting against Red Army and for independence.

Vlodymyr Scerbuc'kyi (1989) Resignation as chief of the communist party.

Break down of Sovietunion (1990) The Sovietunion in a state of dissolution.

Declaration of an independent Ukraine(1990/91) Ukrainians declare the independence.

whereas they have a weak presence in the southern and the eastern regions and in Crimea. The events and the personalities who seek to bring the Ukraine under Russian hegemony are well received in southern and eastern regions or in Crimea and seen as negative mainly in the western region. In the collective memory, as it affects the population, two forces clash with one another. A nation-oriented force in the Western and Central Ukraine encounters a Russia-oriented tendency in the other regions, mainly in the eastern Ukraine. Here too, life is oriented less towards the past than towards the present.

The collective memory is carried in the desired direction by three different language cultures. The exclusively Russian-speaking groups evaluate the Russia-oriented events and personalities positively. The Ukrainian-speaking population views the nation-oriented events positively. Bilingual groups weaken the extremes and mediate between the two opposing tendencies in the historical make-up of the Ukrainian population.

Figure 8: Positive Evaluation of Historical Events and Personalities from the History of the Ukraine (mean value of an additive index of answers supporting their importance) according to the different language groups). See legends of Fig. 7

Events	Ukrainian	Ukrainian and Russian	only Russian
Perejaslawi Treaty (1654)	2.29	2.58	2.49
Zaporizka Sich	2.71	2.62	2.56
Hetman Ivan Mazepa	2.45	2.21	2.08
October Revolution (1917)	1.87	2.22	2.03
Symon Petlyura	2.00	1.62	1.51
Ukrainian Insurrection Army	2.07	1.72	1.62
Stephan Bandera	1.97	1.54	1.42
Viodymyr Sceblyc'kyi	1.96	2.23	2.04
Collapse of USSR	2.01	1.45	1.34
Declaration of Independence	2.49	1.97	1.80

The issue of the remembered past is more than an academic. Even sociological theories have always underestimated its importance in the formation of a collective consciousness. Attitudes towards the present and the past are formed by memories. There are two layers of collective memory in the Ukraine: The one considers the Ukraine as an independent nation, and the

Rationally, the authority of the region, compared to the central government, will be declined in every field that, in the current situation of the Ukraine, lies de jure and de facto under the jurisdiction of the central government. This means that an image of the region's function appears to be developing in the Ukraine, which assumes a division of labour between the region and the central government. Regional expectations are more than a confused reflex. They are on the way to becoming a crystallised picture.

the region as a rational course of action (Figure 9).  
veal clearly that the Ukrainian population views focusing on the growth of a large extent and do not easily allow concerted action. Secondly, results re-Embryonic regionalism implies that the region and the locality are diffuse to diffuse here to be considered a focal point of action for problem-solving. more than 40% find it difficult to decide. The meaning of the region is too amongst less-literate groups and older people, and in the central Ukraine, One third, however, are scarcely able to give a reply. In rural areas, the primary role in the development of the region.

one out of ten (13%) is of the opinion, that the central powers should retain bigger role in the future, more than half (55%) answered positively and only question, whether the local and regional self-governments should assume a cal situation in the local and the regional bodies. In reply to the general times, dominant. The half place their hopes for an improvement of the criti-population. Even in the horizon of expectations, it is important and, some-self-government in the perception, consciousness, and evaluation in the First, results show that the region clearly construct a perspective on local fuse in the Ukrainian population, dependent on type and degree.

tion, how regionally oriented thought and action emerges, or remains dif-for example in Switzerland. Three factors provide an answer to the ques-cause it is just emerging. It is the opposite of a crystallised regionalism, as partially crystallised figure. Regionalism in the Ukraine is embryonic, be-The image of the region as mirrored by actual observations brings forth a

## Embryonic regionalism

other as an area, which is oriented towards the culture, nationality, and sov-ereignty of Russia. These layers of memory conflict with one another. The matter in question is how far the collective memory can influence the role and the function of the region<sup>12</sup>.

Figure 9: Role of the Region in the Future: Where Should it Play a Major Role in the Future? (mean value of an additive index)

In the area of...	
• the economy	.77
• social problems	.74
• environmental problems	.72
• fight against crime	.66
• culture	.61
• fiscal and distribution policy	.02
• international relations	-.01

Let's now take a look at the opposite example: highly crystallised regionalism. In Switzerland, fiscal, resource distribution, and external affairs policies – the areas at the bottom of the priorities list in the Ukraine – are very significant. Cantons and, to some extent, regions protect their tax sovereignty against the Federal Government as their own domain. In the context of "Europeanisation" of regions, they opt for more independence, international cooperation and the ability to sign agreements. Cantons and regions even have their own representatives in Brussels. Regions feel has small states within a small state.

In the Ukraine, on the other hand, there are indications that the rational view of a division of tasks between the region and the nation is not so strictly attached to the idea, that the region should play a more important role in the future. Only every fifth person who hopes to see more weight given to the region is also of the opinion that the region should gain greater jurisdiction in the above-mentioned areas. This group of "hard-core", conservative regionalists is small. The majority of people understand the region as a construct that is used either incompletely or not at all, or perhaps as one that is given only a few concrete functional tasks.

The third observation fits in well with the summary. The image of fear about which problems in the Ukraine might intensify over the next ten years, is hardly overshadowed by the dreams of how regions should develop in the future. These fears paint a "monistic" picture in which social crisis dominates as the main problem over all other perspectives. This view is by no means explicitly applied to the desire for a "social region" (see figure 10). Regional wishful thinking is bivalent. It demonstrates an important contradiction. Fears are not consistently transferred to ideals for a future course of action. Particularly advancing to first place is the desire of the

the embryonal degree of the regional consciousness in the Ukraine. this undecided or diffuse camp is higher by a factor of five. This confirms choose any of the ideals. In comparison with the results from Switzerland, Again, noteworthy is the high percentage of those who are unable to

the ways of overcoming it is also reflected in the regional consciousness. hopes of the population at large. The contradiction between social crisis and But the vision of modernisation does have a chance of finding a place in the the region. The corresponding everyday experience might just be too strong. economy may not be able to penetrate the explicitly crisis-laden image of The strategy of the elite for modernisation, liberalisation and market it also reflects the objective features of a country undergoing a transition. Embryonal regionalism means a bit of highly chaotic consciousness. But

the future of "the region," drift apart in expected directions. The value systems, with which the population of these two countries view protection of autonomy and self-determination appeared in the foreground. Switzerland. Ecology and, especially in the mountain and rural areas, the swered with a yes. The desire for modernisation took a clear step back in istic orientation in regional development? This question must really be an- other words, are the ex-socialist countries forced into a social and modern- Are ecology and regional autonomy privileges of developed nations, or, in

Total value	30	27	15	7	28
Threat to the ecology	29	29	16	10	24
Loss of autonomy	24	31	16	29	
Delays in Modernisation	29	28	14	6	29
Social crisis	32	28	15	8	25
Fears for the region...	Social	modern	autonomous	ecological	diffuse
Ideals for the region					

Figure 10: Ideals for the development of the region in the context of the apprehensions about the future problems in the region

option for modernisation. elite for the modernisation of the economy and technology, together with the desire for a socially-just development. Noteworthy is that ecological val- nes fall down to last place. The desire for more regional autonomy and the activation of their own resources comes in at third place and is linked to the

A fourth result, finally, supports the thesis of embryonal regionalism in the Ukraine. The objective socio-demographic dimensions have a surprisingly low correlation to the indicators of regionalism. This means that the option and the structure of the region in the Ukraine is barely polarised and hence remains open. The empirical signs of a region becoming a separatist alternative for the border regions are very weak if not non-existent. Embryonal regionalism can thus be judged as positive: as an open chance.

### **Renaissance or Conflict?**

The previous section has shown, that the collective memory has hardly any influence on the notions of a region. However the region was explored there in its first, narrow meaning: Region as an „association“ for rational behaviour. The second meaning of region will be examined in this section: a „community,“ which moulds priorities and identities. It can be expected that the collective memory influences regionality in this sense. It preserves the *longue durée*<sup>13</sup> and passes it on to the attitude towards the Ukrainian nation.

The results summarised below confirm that the cultural „Renaissance“ has an especially high significance in the western regions (85-94%). Even in the eastern regions, a majority of nearly 60% underline the importance of a cultural renaissance for the Ukraine. About three-fourths of the population of the metropolitan city of Kiev is of this opinion. Of those asked with a Ukrainian nationality, a strong majority (72%) stressed the importance of the cultural renaissance as compared to those asked with Russian nationality (62%). What measures are significant for this cultural renaissance?

Figure 11: Significance of the domains for the cultural renaissance in the Ukraine (an additive index of positive answers)

Rankings of importance	Value	Reinforcement by regions
1 Strengthening of family	1.87	Crimea
2 Renaissance of language	1.79	western region, Central Ukraine
3 Customs and traditions	1.73	western region, Central Ukraine, Kiev
4 Development of national art	1.69	western region, Kiev
5 Revitalisation of religion	1.57	western region
6 Orientation to modern Western culture	1.17	western region

The top position given to the family again leads us to an important phenomenon. Even in the case of a cultural development and a renewal of the culture, the family remains a central institution. It not only functions as a primary system of self-help in daily life, but also for the salvaging of culture. The loss of trust in the official, mainly political institutions mentioned above is also reflected here. There is a very basic difference between the situation here and that in the western countries.

The second place is occupied by language, followed by traditions, art and religion as the important areas for the Ukrainian renaissance. Re-orientation to western culture is noticeably placed at the last position. The renaissance of the Ukrainian nation is thus by no means connected to a self-devaluing view oriented to the modern western culture. Instead, the people prefer their own historical memory.

One conclusion, however, catches the eye. The macroregion West plays throughout a missionary role. The cultural renaissance is emphasised here above average in all domains. The memory of the Ukrainian idea of a nation is the source for a general mission. The Central Ukraine and Kiev follow this trend. The role of the Western Ukraine as a leader of the new Ukrainian nation is extended to the weight given to the national traditions in daily life. Standards, like speaking the actual Ukrainian language, national traditions, religious holidays or the observance of the domestic cooking culture, are being strengthened systematically and clearly above the average of the other regions. The cultural invention of the nation is calculated at its core: the question of language influence<sup>14</sup>. In another question, the interviewees were to choose an ideal situation for a co-existence of the different language communities.

Figure 12: Patterns of coexistence of the different languages according to the preferences in population and in regions

	Russian and Ukrainian	only Ukrainian	only Russian	pluralistic
western region	15	63	1	21
central Ukraine	56	22	1	21
eastern region	67	10	7	16
southern region	68	11	2	19
Crimea	69	6	6	20
whole Ukraine	53	25	3	19



The western region deviates abruptly from the others by advocating a mono-cultural solution with Ukrainian as the national language at 63%. All the other regions prefer a co-existence of both the main languages, Ukrainian and Russian, by more than half. The other extreme of Russian as the only language is represented by only a small minority. The pluralistic, i.e. the Swiss model, is the first choice of one-fifth of the population.

From this, the inference can be drawn, that a monolingual solution has a hidden conflict for the integration of the Ukraine. The bilingual model, the support of bilinguality, finds consensus with a majority of the population. The important question remains as to what attitude the western region takes towards the other regions.

In this context, a view of the situation in Switzerland is interesting. Its existence as a political nation became possible only because German, French, Italian and Rhaeto-Romanic were recognised as national languages on the basis of the equality principle, regardless of the sizes of the respective areas where these are spoken. As the studies show, the bilingual model also brings additional difficulties and expenditures. At the same time, it gives rise to chances for abilities and subjects that transcend cultural borders, which are a useful impetus for the culture as a whole<sup>5</sup>.

Is a community emerging in the western Ukraine, which, as leader of the renaissance, is delineating itself sociometrically from the other groups in the Ukraine as well? The results clearly indicate movement in this direction.

Figure 13: Interethnic detachment: mean estimation values upon a Bogardus-scale measuring the distance between groups; values for the Ukrainians living in the western region versus those living in the other regions

National intolerances of Ukrainians in the different regions	western region	other regions
Index of intolerance towards...		
Russians	4.01	1.92
Jews	4.65	3.29
Poles	4.17	3.69
Germans	4.74	4.03
Americans	4.89	4.13
Romanians	4.95	4.25
Tschecheniens	6.04	5.27

It is clear that the Ukrainians in the western region behave much more autocentric, separating themselves from the other nationalities, than those in the other parts of the Ukraine. This tendency can be seen in all the

groups included in the interview. The highlight is the specific intolerance in the western region towards the Russians. The collective consciousness and the mission for the Ukrainian renaissance and nation (in the domain of the language and cultural norms) is connected in the western Ukraine with an ethnocentric attitude. In contrast to the less crystallised and diffuse picture about the function and the role of the region, the cultural axis between the macroregion west and the remaining Ukraine crystallises more towards an ethno-culturally stressed regionalism.

This can be interpreted in different ways. Some see in this attitude the effect of the historical experience of having remained a minority within "Greater Russia", who was never able to win its own sovereignty. More decisive is to follow the strategy by which the new national state is committing itself to cultural hegemony. The ethno-cultural demarcation towards others is an instrument and reflects here a strengthened identity. Significant in this interpretation is that separatism or ethnocentrism is by no means the goal of the region, rather the strengthening of the Ukraine as an independent nation.

The other interpretation arises from the perspective constructed from memory. The Western Ukraine tends towards self-exaggeration and missionarism, which are conditioned by the ancient burden of being a belated or a disabled nation. These symptoms make it difficult both to reconcile the contradictions in memory and to hide conflict potential and they could lead to an integration crisis and/or separatism. The connection of the other regions with Russia is probably a consequence of this division. There is no doubt that the ethno-cultural detachment of the Western Ukraine from Russia does not rule out these possibilities.

The memory of the two layers of experience influences the contradictions of the present. The internal structure of the Ukraine, independent since 1991, is showing tensions. How do the citizens of the Ukraine view the outside world, and how do they evaluate the possible conflicts?

## **Internal and External Affairs: International Orientations and Areas of Conflict**

The above-mentioned tensions affect internal political issues. It is surprising how clearly the Ukrainian population wants to decide the two main issues between Russia and the Ukraine, i.e. the question of the Navy in the




Figure 14: The opinion of the Ukrainian population on the alliances and the conflicts, the Navy and Crimea


Black Sea and the status of Crimea, in favour of the Ukraine (figure 14). Not even 10% of the Ukrainian population is in favour of returning the Navy to the Russian Federation. Two-thirds are against this solution of the conflict between the Ukraine and the Russian Federation. One-fifth of the persons asked were not sure or could not decide. This again implies that the opinions are flexible, and can vary in one direction or the other depending upon what course the issue takes.

An important issue for the unity of the new state of the Ukraine is the status of the Crimean peninsula, which is inhabited mostly by Russians. In the general Ukrainian opinion, only 12% would support the foundation of an independent Republic of Crimea. 59% oppose the foundation of a Republic of Crimea as a solution for the problem. But again, about 29% cannot decide clearly in this issue vital for Ukrainian integration. Even in the current political issues, the proportion of the persons having an unclear stand is high in comparison to the studies in western countries.

What stand does the Ukrainian population take to the outside world? As before, a small minority of 47% are favourably disposed towards a re-unification with the Russian Federation. A bit more than one-third is strongly against it and 18% of the population is undecided. It is clear that the notion of a re-unification with Russia is anchored more strongly in the population than in the government in the capital city of Kiev. The reasons for this attitude in the population have shown themselves above in other results, especially as the effect of a social crisis-oriented consciousness. The outlook to the strong connections to the centers of economy and resources (energy/raw materials) in Russia seems to weigh in as a hard argument.

Measuring the Ukraine by the attitude of the population, it is a nation with a "hinge function", signaling an openness to different directions<sup>16</sup>. The close cooperation with the CIS countries and especially with the countries in Eastern and Central Europe is compatible with the desire of entering the EU (figure 15). The following distribution of answers resulted from the question, how the persons interviewed would vote on the following issues:

Figure 15: Views of the Ukrainian population on the accession to EU and NATO in a plebiscite




A majority of 55% of the Ukrainian population would vote for an accession to the EU, but less than a third could decide for entry into NATO. However, only one-fifth clearly opposes joining NATO. Considerably high is the per-

centage of those who did not vote, were undecided, or else had very little knowledge about the issue. The opinions towards the European Union are more strongly crystallised than those towards NATO.

**In the tension-triangle between West, East and South**

How far do the attitudes on external political affairs break along the macro-regional axis dividing the Ukraine? The figures 16 point out empirically the ethno-culturally shaped west-/east gap and partly also a north-/south difference for all three conflict areas. They make the internal integration of the Ukraine as a new nation state difficult. As expected, the western region strongly opposes the return of the Navy, the independence of Crimea, and re-unification. One can interpret this opposition as a measure of the degree to which a region takes a stance towards the Ukraine as an independent nation, i.e. how much it identifies itself nationally. According to this indicator, the national identity is the highest in the west, is also high in the central region, but reduces in the east, even more so in the south, in the “New Ukraine”, and quite clearly in Crimea.

Figure 16: Opinions on the most important external political issues by region






Figure 17: Orientations to the West depending upon the regional system of Ukraine

**The orientation to the West**

The attitude towards Russia is an interesting indicator. The relationship with Russia is polarised along the regional lines of division. The central and eastern regions stress upon the acceptance of re-unification, whereas the western region strongly opposes it. A difference of 20% can even be observed in the number of re-unification supporters in the western and the central regions. Even when the special status of Crimea is not taken into account, there is still considerable potential for conflict in the question of a delimitation with Russia. On the basis of these results, it can be expected that the opinion of the population on western economic and security architecture also varies along the regions. b) Independence for Crimea

The hypothesis is confirmed in view of joining NATO, but not with reference to the attitude towards the EU (Figure 17). The attitude towards accession to the EU is equally high in all five regions and is rarely debated. Crimea as an externally oriented region, confirms this with the highest pro-attitude compared to the other regions. Even in western Europe, it is mostly

marginalised regions with dissident tendencies towards the centre, who try to gain more autonomy by pursuing their cases via Brussels. Yet it is surprising that no “en bloc” attitude for or against the West is expressed. The population clearly differentiates between the military and the economic perspectives. With its weak opposition towards joining NATO in the western regions, the Ukrainian pattern is similar to that of Hungary or Poland. This shows the ethno-cultural demarcation of the western region not only in the field of a cultural renaissance, but also in that of political alliance.

### **Options for regional cooperation within the population**

Which regional-political options appear in the population and towards what should the region orient itself in future development (Figure 18)? In first place, with one-third of the votes, is the national domestic, regional perspective. As per public opinion, the construction of an interregional cooperation network is the most important regional strategy for the Ukraine. In the second position, is international orientation, namely the increased cooperation with the countries of the earlier Soviet Union (CIS). With this, stand and stood business relations and interweavings. The middle is occupied by three options: (1) The concentration on relations with Russia, (2) the increased cooperation with the EU, and (3) the strategy of independence - realised consciously as a disengagement from Kiev as centre -, which is represented by a weak 12% consent. Finally, there is the orientation to the earlier socialist system, which, at the time of the Comecon, portrayed, for many, the daily experience in the former planned economy system.

Results show that very little importance is attached to a regionalist independence in the Ukraine, unlike what can be observed in federalist countries. Economically seen, the region is not considered by the population to be a strong, independent framework and horizon of development. On the other hand, the population is more open towards interregional and international relations of the region based on the principle of a closeness to neighbouring countries.

One can explain this attitude of the Ukrainian population with the centric model. Relations are developed upon the neighbourhood principle, but these relations are border-crossing. These relationships have to do with reasons of the economic interweaving that dates back to the Comecon.

External and macropolitics of the new countries of Eastern Europe are the main topics of discussion in the media and in official circles. However,

**I The three meanings of "Region" in the Ukraine**  
 Region and regionality, the realms of vicinity and experience, have three meanings for the Ukrainian population:

- The local and regional vicinity guarantees a bonding and a sense of belonging: The population is the base of a civic society. It feels itself emotionally attached to the local-regional area and identifies itself with it. In times of crisis, this area is a much more important "private fatherland".
- Modern and social region: The region and the local self-governments in the Ukraine are expected, in times of crisis, to become simultaneously a

### Conclusions for Research and Practice

an insight into the perceptions, opinions and the ideas of the population shows, that internal and micropolitics are more important considerations in these countries for efforts working towards democratic, social and civic-social developments.




Figure 18: Orientation pattern for the cooperation of one's region with others



In reality, the region is recognised in its implication as an instrument for transition – a pragmatic regionalism of self-help – but, to a large extent, it remains diffuse. In countries with a longer tradition, the significance and the role of the region as a framework for acting has “crystallised” strongly. Conversely, the image of the region in this respect is only emerging in the

role of the region as a rational instrument for building a modern and social this problem. This ethno-cultural form of regional tension overshadows the Ukraine, but also its international security depends upon the solution to some extent, this is justified, since not only the political stability of the tension between the Russia-oriented and the nation-oriented camps. To dated almost exclusively in its third implication – as a source of friction and On the international scene, regionality in the Ukraine is perceived and de-

## II Regionality and its context in the Ukraine

The ethno-cultural region propagates itself in various, and to some extent, tension-filled differences, when international orientations are examined. The Western Ukraine strongly refuses a re-unification with Russia, whereas this is, or could be, a majority vote in the Crimea, Eastern and, partially, in the Southern region. Between the two camps, the controversial issue is joining NATO, while the other issues, especially an accession to the EU, are not so often debated.

Ukrainian/Russian bilinguality.

wards all the aspects of a cultural renaissance and stress upon the within Russian history and sovereignty. They have a reserved attitude towards the other memory. They consider the Ukraine as an enclosed chamber especially the eastern region and the “New Ukraine” incline more towards national language and ethno-cultural demarcation. The other regions, especially upon the renaissance of the Ukrainian culture, Ukrainian as the preferred for an independent Ukrainian nation. The symptoms are an emphasis and, to some extent, in the Central Ukraine, one considers oneself a force memory of the history of the nation works at two levels. In the Western region in the Ukraine stretches beyond the aforesaid meanings. The

- Ethno-cultural regionality as the source of tension: The ethno-cultural regional behaviour within the near area.

Regionality in this sense is an association, an instrument for guiding a modern as well as a social society within the framework of a region.

The results of the study "Regions in the Ukraine" provide five starting points for further work:

- 1) The study verifies, that the region has a multifaceted significance for the transition of the previously socialist countries, upon which, light is thrown by questions of system change and nationality. The comparative study and the dialogue on regionality and regions in the Ukraine is thus to be extended specifically to all those countries, which are also in the process of a transformation.
- 2) The results arose from a "survey into the unknown" with the sociological instrument of a representative survey. It is recommended to replicate the survey in order to be able to pursue further developments and to conduct the study later going more in details.
- 3) As an example of a society undergoing transformation, the region in the Ukraine can become an important, probably decisive handling tool. For

### III Future Prospects

An alarming social crisis stands in the foreground in the consciousness of the Ukrainian society. At the same time, the ways of handling it are evaluated as strongly pessimistic and fatalistic. There is a loss of trust between the political actors and institutions and the population. Results of the study reveal that, in this situation, the attitudes and the opinions are strengthened in very specific directions: Disconcertedness, contradictions, and nihilistic tendencies, which could be connected to indifference and conformism. This is related to an observation, which may appear to be a paradox for a "new nation". A majority of the Ukrainian population prefers a life perspective that is oriented towards the past rather than towards the present or the future.

This backward orientation can support the revival of memory and emotionally charge ethno-cultural regionalism and the antagonistic attitude towards the nation and the culture. The sense of belonging to the historically-ethnically defined "communal group" becomes more important. The region in its significance as a rational group for an effective improvement of the situation and for the future, remains or becomes secondary.

The results of the study "Regions in the Ukraine" provide five starting points for further work:

- 1 Studies show that the patterns of spatial identifications, mainly the bonds to regions and communities are stable. They are rooted in collective memories reflecting the building of nation: Hans-Peter Meier (1988), *Die Schweiz zwischen Traditionalität und Modernität*, in: H. G. Wehling (eds.), *Die Schweiz, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag*, p. 100-126.
- 2 In Western Europe publications as well as informations concerning the history of the Ukraine are missing; in German language there is a book: Andreas Kappelet (1994), *Kleine Geschichte der Ukraine*, München: Verlag C. H. Beck. An interesting publication was published recently in UK: Andrew Wilson (1997), *Ukrainian Nationalism in the 1990s Cambridge: University Press*.
- 3 The Ukrainian team is editing a book describing and interpreting the empirical results more in detail: Nicolay Churlov, Olexander Stegny (1998), *Regionalism in the Ukraine as a Subject of Sociological Research* (forthcoming in Ukrainian).
- 4 A substantial frame-work of regionally oriented social research in Western Europe goes back to Stein Rokkan, Derek Urwin (Hrsg.) 1982, *The Politics of Territorial Identity – Studies in European Regionalism*, London: Sage.
- 5 "New nation nationalism" was evidently linked with forward oriented expectations for development and of 'making man modern' (Inkeles) since the post colonial period until the 70s. In the 90s a change seems to be visible in all parts of the world. The revitalisation of history and traditions is an important focus of reorientations among people. But this ideological shift appears to be a contradictory phenomenon, since simultaneously regions adopt modern technologies and consumer goods or styles.
- 6 The ranking of problems has changed in Western Europe in the course of the economic crisis. This trend is probably strengthened in France and in Germany. There is a convergence between Eastern and Western countries if the fears are considered among people. See to the perception of crisis in Switzerland: Hans-Peter Meier, Rolf Nef (1996), *Risiko und innere Sicherheit in der Wahrnehmung der Bevölkerung*, in Volker Preuss (ed.), *Risikoanalysen, Heidelberg: Roland Asannger Verlag*, 214–321.
- 7 The ideal of European Union, for instance, is not seen as a paradise of modern values, such as technologies and international market, but as a regionally based and ecologically oriented development (See in case of Switzerland: Hans-Peter Meier (1995), *Die schwarze Spinnweb*, Montfort, 47. Jg., Heft 1, p. 48).
- 8 The hypothesis is evident as a gap between the "old" Swiss German speaking regions,

## Notes

- 4) In countries like the Ukraine, the regional issue is charged ethno-cultural. Conflicts of integration and risks of political security are probable. For this reason, the results must be evaluated in dialogue with politicians and representatives of external politics for new measures.
  - 5) Western countries, which look back at a tradition and a well-functioning regional-political system and instrumentation, can examine critically the new forms of regionalism from this angle. "Crystallisation" of regionalism can then also lead to a "petrification".
- this reason, it is important to establish contacts with all those agencies, which undertake project work in the Ukraine and exchange projects with the partner countries of the Union, with Germany and Switzerland. This would enable one to clearly view the regional pre-requisites, aims, effects and evaluations and to include them in the project work.

- which are more inside and traditionally oriented, on the one hand, and the "new" regions of French speaking regions strengthening the outside and future orientations. The dissent between the two parts of Switzerland is visible in issues such as modernisation and affiliation or membership to the EU: (see Meier 1995, op. cit., p. 47ff. and (1991), La Suisse: contrasts européens en modèle réduit?, in: Bassand (ed.), Identité et développement régional, Bern: Peter Lang Verlag, 57-80.
- 9 Periodic polls in the Ukraine confirm this trend. The worsened material situations correlate with distrust to the actors and potentials for democratic handling with problems: see: Nikolay Churliov, Olexander Stegniy (1997), Political Culture of Population in the Ukraine, paper, 3th Berlin Conference on Elections and Democratic Consolidation).
- 10 The term has regained its meaning in the debate on "civic society" arising in the NIS. See Gabriel, A. Almond, Sidney Verba (1963), *The Civic Culture*, New Jersey: Princeton.
- 11 It was the nationally oriented elite itself, for instance Dmytro Dontsov (Wilson 97, op. cit. p. 42), who criticised the feelings of inferiority as reasons explaining the failure of building an Ukrainian nation state. However there are historically shaped structural conditions. Whilst in the western region of Ukraine forms of urban freedom have developed in the Middle Age, the other parts of the Ukraine remained rural and agrarian cultures, where passive attitudes to sovereignty or urban styles of life were predominant. The attitude to the "small-Russian" syndrome, the tolerance to the "older brother" seems to be rooted in such differences.
- 12 The concept of "collective memory" ( Maurice Halbwachs (1952), *Les cadres sociaux de la mémoire*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France) has had its come back in the 80s. Since this time the discussion about the impacts of the past on the present seems to become polarised. An "instrumental" thesis assumes that identities are simultaneously created as tools for the building and consolidation of national states in the 19th century, that means nationalism is a recent phenomenon (see for instance, Ernest Gellner (1991), *Nations and Nationalism* (Nations and Nationalism), Warszawa: PIW). Historically oriented sociology assumes rather an 'organic' point of view: identities are rooted in the history before the nation genesis. (see: John Armstrong (1982), *Nations before Nationalism*, North Carolina Press, Benedykt Zientara (1985), *Swit narodow europejskich. Powstanie swiadomosci narodowej na obszarcach Europy post-karolinskiej* (The Dawn of European Nations. The Formation of National Consciousness in Post-Carolinian Europe, Warszawa: PIW).
- 13 The theory of civilisations recovered the 'longue durée' on the base of studies dealing with long term processes. This approach was initiated by the scholars around Braudel; see Fernand Braudel (1986), *L'identité de la France*, Paris: Artaud-Flammarion or 1987, *Die Geschichte*, in: Braudel, Duby, Aymard (eds.), *Die Welt des Mittelmeeres*, Frankfurt a. M.: S. Fischer, 95-117.
- 14 The building of nations described by B. Anderson is due to the recovery and forming of language. Elites play the role of avantgarde. Step by step the power or administrative elites create later the state structures and institutions instrumentalising this cultural capital i.e. language. This process can be illustrated at the case of Ukrainian literature in last century: the "Eneida" (Ivan Kotljarevskyj), the Cosack legends "Dumy", the "Istoria Rusov", the first historia of the Ukraine (in Russian!). The latter work influenced writers like Sevcenko, Gogol and Pusckin. The language used in administration and education served as the medium for the cultural invention of nation. (see: Benedict Anderson (1985), *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso).
- 15 Although in Switzerland a "pax linguistica" between the different languages was found, it is noteworthy, that conflicts and tensions are still existent. (see: Ernst Weibel (1988), *Sprachgruppen und Sprachprobleme in der Schweiz*, in: Wehling (eds.), *Die Schweiz*, Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 79-99). The pluralistic model of language is, for instance, confronted with the fact that the global language, the American or English, could displace the incentives to learn a second national language.
- 16 Between a nationalistically reinforced "européanism" and an "euro-asiatic" ideology including Belarus and Russia the third way for the Ukraine could have a base in the results of the study, how Kutschma it defined: "Ukraine can become a bridge between East and West", whilst remaining an independent state with links to both camps (cit. Wilson 1997, op. cit. p. 192).

## Appendix: The studied regions

The 1200 interviews carried out orally were distributed over the following regions (oblasty), which in the evaluation were put together to macroregions:

<b>Central Macroregion (central)</b>	
Central areas: Kiev, Chernigov, Zhytomir	
Northwestern areas: Rivne, Volyn (Luts'k), Khmel'nyts'k	
Western areas: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil	
South-western areas: Cherkas'kyi, Transkarpapat (Uzhgorod)	
Size and population: 192,300 sq.km, 11.55 million inhabitants, 8.76 million in cities	
Economic structure: Industry and agriculture	
Language: Equally high percentage of Russian and Ukrainian speaking population	
History: Inhabited commonly by Ukrainians and Russians during the last two centuries (mainly the northern subregions)	
<b>Western macroregion (west)</b>	
North-western areas: Rivne, Volyn (Luts'k), Khmel'nyts'k	
Western areas: Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil	
South-western areas: Cherkas'kyi, Transkarpapat (Uzhgorod)	
Size and population: 131,300 sq.km, 11.55 million inhabitants, 5.53 million in cities	
Economic structure: Agriculture	
Language: Dominant portion of Ukrainian and Ukrainian speaking population	
History: Belonged to different central European states and systems and was included in the Ukraine only after the Second World War	
<b>Eastern macroregion (east)</b>	
Northern areas: Kharkov, Sumy	
Eastern areas: Donetsk, Lugansk	
South-eastern region: Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporozhye	
Size and population: 167,500 sq.km, 18.85 million inhabitants, 15.6 million in cities	
Economic structure: Industry, machine and heavy industry, mines	
Language: Majority of Russians and Russian speaking population	
History: Strong immigration wave of Russians linked to industrialisation since the beginning of the 20th century	
<b>Southern Region</b>	
Southern areas: Odessa, Nikolayev, Kherson	
Size and population: 86,400 sq.km, 5.24 million inhabitants, 3.41 million in cities	
Economic structure: Industry, machine and heavy industry, mines	
Language: Majority of Russians and Russian speaking population	
History: Strong immigration wave of Russians linked to industrialisation since the beginning of the 20th century	
<b>Crimea (Simpheropol)</b>	
Size and population: 27,000 sq.km, 2.55 million inhabitants, 1.76 million in cities	
Economic structure: Recreation and tourist area	
Language: Majority of Russian and Russian speaking population	
History: Part of the former Soviet Republic of Ukraine since 1954	